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Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of rapeseed hail insurance and chemical
input decisions using individual panel data set of French farms covering the period from
1993 to 2004. Economic theory suggests that insurance and prevention decisions are not
independent due to risk reduction and/or moral hazard eﬀects. We propose a theoretical
framework that integrates two statistically independent sources of risk faced by farmers of
our sample hail risk and pest risk. Statistical tests conﬁrm that chemical and insurance
demands are endogenous to each other and simultaneously determined. An econometric
model involving two simultaneous equations with mixed censored/continuous dependent
variables is thus estimated for rapeseed. Estimation results show that rapeseed insurance
demand has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on pesticide use and vice versa. Insurance
demand is also positively inﬂuenced by the yield's coeﬃcient of variation and the loss ratio,
and negatively inﬂuenced by proxies for wealth (including CAP subsidies) and activity
diversiﬁcation.
Keywords: Crop insurance, Pesticide use, Simultaneous equations.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
In recent years, agricultural risk management has become a key issue of agricultural policy
reforms. The context has indeed changed deeply. Price support policies1, which provide
farmers an economic safety net in addition to income support, tend to disappear under
the pressure of world trade liberalization and environmental concerns, raising the issue of
price risk management in a liberalized world (World Bank, 2005). At the same time, a
substantial number of production risks due to climatic and phytosanitary hazards remain
uninsurable without government support in favor of crop insurance (World Bank, 2005).
Under free trade, production shocks are no longer compensated by rises in prices, a natu-
ral hedge of farmers' revenues that renders useless the need for crop insurance in autarky.
The importance of climatic and phytosanitary risks as well as price volatility are thus call-
ing for policy responses. The usual argument for risk policies in agriculture relies on the
incompleteness of contingent claims markets that makes competitive markets ineﬃcient in
the short term. Such ineﬃciency provides a theoretical argument, in certain circumstances,
for second-best Pareto improving government interventions that would mimic such absent
contingent claims markets and restore the correct price incentives (Newbery and Stiglitz,
1981; Innes, 1990). In the long term, incomplete insurance and/or credit market lead to a
too high, socially ineﬃcient farm turnover, some viable agricultural ﬁrms being artiﬁcially
unable to survive to temporary shocks (Kirwan, 2009). Despite these well-founded theo-
retical justiﬁcations2, the consensus is far too be reached about the true costs and beneﬁts
of government crop insurance programmes that take place in real world. Crop insurance
markets are usually plagued by various kinds of market failures, making the distinction
between welfare-enhancing and redistributive objectives particularly uneasy. Since in de-
veloped countries crop insurance programmes often involve substantial ﬁnancial support
from governments, this raises the issue of disguised subsidies. In addition to being highly
controversial in terms of their pure risk-sharing beneﬁts, it is frequently pointed out that
1through public storage in the European Union or Target Prices in the United States
2Such normative result must be qualiﬁed. Indeed, the welfare gains, eventually losses, from risk policies
have been shown to be highly sensitive to changes in parameters, especially supply and demand elasticities
(Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Innes (1990)). More profound is the critics by Dixit, who considers that
welfare gains coming from government interventions may be highly overestimated because classical models
implicitly assume governments to be immune to the fundamental causes that make market collapse, such
as moral hazard, adverse selection or imperfect observability
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government risk management programmes (in particular crop insurance ones) may have
adverse environmental consequences. In particular, they would incite farmers to produce
more, on more degraded lands, by using higher levels of risk-increasing inputs such as
fertilizers and selecting shorter crop rotations, the same crucial critics that were already
addressed to the classical, price-support based, agricultural policies of the 70's-80's .
The United States provide an interesting illustration of this debate. In this country, gov-
ernment crop insurance programmes constitute after nearly three decades of existence a
growing component, if not one of the building block of the Farm Bill. Crop insurance pro-
grammes take the form of a public-private partnership between the Federal Government,
through the Risk Management Agency (United States Department of Agriculture) and pri-
vate primary insurers. Government support include substantial premium subsidies, Federal
Reinsurance of last resort and reimbursement of primary insurers' administrative costs. In
spite of such ﬁnancial support, provided through various channels, farmers' participation
has always been low and diﬃcult to boost, but recent increases in premium subsidies lead
to reach a participation rate of nearly 80% (Glauber, 2004). Several empirical analysis of
U.S. crop insurance programmes tend to show that crop insurance programmes have nega-
tive environmental consequences through the production distortions they create (Roberts
et al., 2004). Moreover, a recent paper by Kirwan (2009) shows that the farm failure rate
has increased by 1.7 percentage points (30 percents) after the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform
Act, that replaced ad-hoc disaster reliefs by crop insurance subsidies as the major form of
government intervention. Last but not least, expanded crop insurance programmes did not
succeed in eliminating Disaster Bills, i.e. ad-hoc transfers made by the Federal Government
to support farmers in times of ﬁnancial distresses due to adverse climate shocks.
In the European Union, growing attention is also being paid to weather risks in agricul-
ture in a context of profound reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereafter CAP).
The European system diﬀers from the U.S. one. Price risks are managed at the EU level
through guaranteed prices while weather risks and crop insurance programmes, when they
exist, are under the responsibility of Member States. Guaranteed prices have decreased
due to CAP reforms and have been replaced by decoupled agricultural subsidies to support
farm revenues, with an a priori ambiguous impact in terms of farmers' risk aversion (more
risk due to less price protection but less risk aversion due to a wealth eﬀect). This has
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lead Member States to assess the possibility of a crop insurance programme at the E.U.
level (see the European project for a deeper analysis). Enlarging the perimeter of mutual-
ization for risks that are considered as systemic at the National scale has undoubted some
economic sense, but the lessons from the costly U.S. experience certainly incite regulators
to prudence.
This paper deals with multiple risks decision making in agriculture by investigating the
determinants of rapeseed hail crop insurance and pesticides uses, using an original panel
data set of French farms covering the period from 1993 to 2004. We ﬁrst propose a theo-
retical background, and then follow the reduced form approach and build an econometric
model involving two simultaneous equations with a mixed censored/continuous dependent
variables to account for potential endogeneity, which we estimate.
Related literature. The relation between production and insurance/hedging deci-
sions is a central aspect of the welfare and redistributive impacts of crop insurance pro-
grammes. There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on farmers' choices involving
risk that intend to estimate how risk preference do indeed aﬀect farmers' production and
ﬁnancial choices, and how these choices interact (Just, 2000; Just and Pope, 2003). Most
papers concern the U.S. case, in part because several reforms of Federal risk management
programmes have stimulated empirical research on this topic. Garrido and Zilberman
(2005), Ogurtsov et al. (2008) and Velandia et al. (2009) estimate the simultaneous de-
mand for crop insurance and other risk management instruments (forward contracts, etc.)
as a function of farms' characteristics. Another group of related papers focus on the relation
between insurance and production choices, providing some empirical testing of the possible
distorsive eﬀects of risk management instruments (eventually magniﬁed by public subsi-
dies): Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) results suggest that crop insurance has encouraged
pesticide and fertilizer input uses for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest. This contrasts
with Smith and Baquet (1996), whose estimations show that fertilizer and pesticide inputs
for Kansas wheat producers tend to be negatively correlated with insurance purchases. Wu
(1999) is the ﬁrst to extend the analysis to acreage decisions as a risk diversiﬁcation tool.
In his estimation of the eﬀect of crop insurance on crop acreage allocation and pesticide
use in Central Nebraska Basins, he shows that crop insurance participation encourages
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producers to switch to crops in higher economic values. In a more recent paper, Goodwin
et al. (2004) study the acreage eﬀects of crop insurance using the samples of corn and
soybeans production in the U.S. Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in Northern
Great Plains. They estimate a simultaneous equation model to take into account a larger
set of endogenous risk decisions of agricultural producers to simulate the possible eﬀects
of large premium changes. Their results suggest a relatively modest acreage responses to
expanded insurance subsidies. In a very recent study on insurance and acreage decisions,
O'Donoghue et al. (2009) conduct an empirical analysis of the interaction between spe-
cialization and the price of crop insurance, which has been lowered through an increase
in Federal premium subsidies by the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act. They found a
statistically signiﬁcant but small positive relation between the degree of specialization and
the level of premium subsidies.
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature. First, risk management
choices are generally endogenous, suggesting possible substitutions or complementarities
between risk management instruments. Second, typical explanatory variables that may
inﬂuence farmers' risk aversion such as yields' coeﬃcients of variation, ﬁnancial ratios
(an imperfect measure of liquidity constraint), farmers' wealth, land ownership are most
of the time statistically signiﬁcant. This tends to support that risk do indeed matter
in farmer's production decisions. Third, although statistically signiﬁcant, some variables
have in some cases a small quantitative eﬀect (O'Donoghue et al., 2009), in other cases
strong quantitative eﬀects, suggesting prudence in drawing too general policy conclusions
at the national scale. Four, results may be qualitatively contradictory and unexpected with
regards to theoretical prediction, in particular the relation between insurance and input
uses. Theory suggests that the demand for risk-reducing inputs should be lower for those
who buy insurance than for those who do not buy because of a standard moral hazard
eﬀect. This moral hazard argument, which has been the cornerstone of empirical studies
and discussions on the subject in the U.S.A, is particularly relevant in this country because
of the nature of crop insurance policies. These are multiple peril, which means that they
provide coverage against any source of yield risk, including pest risk, which is manipulable
by the farmer. Theory predicts a negative relation between the demand for insurance and
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the consumption of risk-reducing inputs.
Preceding empirical studies3, mainly based on U.S. data, did not lead to clear cut con-
clusions concerning the sign of the correlation between pesticide and insurance decisions4,
although the fact that both decisions are made endogenously are rarely challenged5. Since
many producers' decisions involve risk considerations, it is diﬃcult to build a theoretical
model that would capture an exhaustive analysis of their interactions (Goodwin et al.,
2004) and yield unambiguous results, even in a static model. The classical moral hazard
framework does not include multiple sources of risks, adverse selection, price risk, which
may be potential explanations of these contradictory results.
The current paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of
relying on aggregated time-series or cross-section data as in most of previous studies, we use
farm-level data. This is expected to provide us with a more precise description of individual
decisions. Second, the current study uses panel data, which possess several advantages over
conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets, while exploiting genuinely observed
regime transitions. At last, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the empirical
analysis of risk management decisions in the case of France and other European countries
(Koundouri et al., 2009; Mosnier et al., 2009).
This paper is organized as follows. Some key facts concerning cereal production, weather
risks and crop insurance in France are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the
theoretical background of simultaneous input and insurance decisions. In section 4 we
present the empirical model followed by a description of the data and estimation results.
We conclude in section 5 with a summary of our results and research perspective.
3Another group of papers also deal with farmers' risk-taking decisions but diﬀer in their econometric
approach of the cited ones by building structural instead of reduced-form models. The advantage of such
approach is to allow for simultaneous estimation of production technology parameters and risk preferences.
Examples of papers ﬁtting with this approach are Chavas and Holt (1996) and more recently and Koundouri
et al. (2009) to evaluate the risk and wealth eﬀects of agricultural policy changes towards decoupling in
the European Union.
4Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) have found a positive correlation between crop insurance and chemical
input usage for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest. However, Smith and Goodwin (1996) demonstrated
that fertilizer and chemical usage for Kansas wheat producers tended to be negatively correlated with
insurance purchases. Wu (1999) and Goodwin, et al. (2004) suggest no clear relationship between crop
insurance demand and input use.
5Using Hausman-Wu test, Goodwin et al. (2004), Smith and Baquet (1996) and Wu (1999) have found
that insurance, crop mix, and chemical use decisions are not exogenous and should be estimated using a
simultaneous equations approach.
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2 Policy context for crop insurance in France
2.1 The French system before 2005: duality between private and public
coverage
The French agricultural sector is characterized by production diversity at the national level
and a high degree of regional specialization. Most of the French farms are specialized in
a narrow set of crops. The main climate risks are frost, hail and drought. Frost and hail
risks mostly concern wine-growing and arboricultural, while hail and drought are the ﬁrst
causes of crop losses for non perennial crops (cereals essentially). Like other countries
aiming at stabilizing farmers' revenues, France is doted with a speciﬁc agricultural insur-
ance system against agricultural climate risks, which can be described as follows. First,
risks are classiﬁed in two categories: insurable and uninsurable. Insurable risks are cov-
ered by private markets without any government intervention (or a very limited one) while
uninsurable risks are covered by a public guarantee fund, the Fonds National de Garantie
des Calamités Agricoles (FNGCA), created by the law of 1964. Private and public cov-
erage thus coexist without competing with each other. The insurability criteria are not
explicitly deﬁned in the law of 1964, although it states that the set of insurable risks is
susceptible to evolve if the private sector becomes able to develop its own supply. The fund
profoundly diﬀers from private insurance market. First it is not ﬁnanced by actuarially fair
premiums, but by the mix of a mandatory contribution on farmers' property/liability in-
surance contracts and a government subsidy, with approximately an equal sharing between
the two sources (the "parity principle"). Thus premiums are not risk based and govern-
ment participation implies a positive redistribution, in average, from taxpayers to the farm
sector. Second, indemniﬁcations are upper-bounded by the amount available in the funds,
and so are not contractually prespeciﬁed as it is the case in a typical insurance contract.
Third, the fund pools several risks (drought, hail...) for several products (wheat, maize,
fruits...) which without practicing risk-based premiums is a source of cross-subsidization
across farms with diﬀerent specializations (between maize producers and wine-growers, for
example) since mandatory contributions are not actuarially fair. The system has clearly
some advantages, notably the fact that mandatory participation implies a large pooling of
diversiﬁed risks, but also defaults: premiums are not functions of risks, which is a source
of distortional choices, and the levels of indemniﬁcations are low, even with the presence
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of a large amount of government subsidies. Hence the paradox: if redistribution from
taxpayers to farmers is positive in the mean, farmers often criticize the low levels of in-
demniﬁcations (around 30% of expected losses are indemniﬁed). Moreover farmers are not
free to choose between diﬀerent levels of coverage if they diﬀer in their risk preferences and
their opportunities to diversify risks.
2.2 The private crop insurance market in France
Until the reform of 2005, hail was the main risk covered by a private insurance market
in France, i.e. without government subsidies nor government reinsurance of last resort
interventions. Hail insurance contracts are proposed by several insurance companies spe-
cialized in ﬁnancial products for the agricultural sector. The proposed contracts can be
described as follows. Indemnities are provided when the ﬁnal yield is under a threshold
value, which is freely chosen by the producer as a percentage of his reference yield. The
reference yield is the mean of the ﬁve preceding years, leaving apart the higher and the
lower values. When no yield data is available for an individual producer (which can occur
if he has never cultivated the crop), the mean departemental yield is used as a proxy. Some
standardized values of deductibles are proposed, which are typically 5%, 10% and 15% of
reference yields for cereals such as wheat and maize, and 10% and 15% for rapeseed. In
addition to choosing their deductible, producers are free to choose the price at which they
will be indemniﬁed, up to a maximum price ﬁxed by the insurer. The latter provides infor-
mation about prices forecast to help farmers to make their choice. In case of yield losses,
indemniﬁcations are based on plots, not on the total farm output for the given product.
Thus if total farm yield per acre is higher than the yield that triggers indemniﬁcations but
lower on a given plot, indemniﬁcations will be made for this plot (this is not the case for
other risks included in the package of the reform of 2005). In order to control for potential
moral hazard problems, audits are made in order to verify that appropriate agricultural
practices were followed, in particular the use of phytosanitary products. Since the crop
insurance reforms initiated in 2006, private insurers now propose multiple risk insurance
contracts that cover not only hail on a plot basis, but twelve new sources of climatic risks
including drought, etc. on a mean farm yield basis. The basket of risks covered by these
new insurance contracts can be chosen by the producer. Contrary to the traditional hail
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insurance contract, these contracts are now subsidized by the government at a rate of 35%
of the premium.
2.3 The recent reforms: towards a public-private partnership?
The system has been reformed strongly in recent years. The reform of 2005 aimed at
extending the set of insurable risks, i.e. risks covered by private insurers. Before this
date, mainly hail risk was insured through the private market in a sustainable way without
government support. The reform of 2005 introduced for the ﬁrst time large scale premium
subsidies in order to stimulate farmers' demand and incite private insurers to expand their
agricultural insurance supply to a larger set of risks. Subsidized contracts are targeted
to cereal producers and provide coverage against multiple risks, as in the United States
(twelve risks including drought, frost etc.). After a few years of existence, participation
is not negligible but still limited. Although it seems to be inspired by the U.S. system,
important diﬀerences subsist. First, premium subsidies are considered as temporary. The
underlying idea is to encourage learning on both supply and demand sides: on supply side,
since insurers propose new contracts that may be susceptible of high ﬁnancial exposure
due to correlated risks (drought in particular); on the demand side since farmers were not
used to making free choices before. Second, although the debate remains open, the French
government does not play the role of reinsurer of last resort as in the U.S. system. The
current trend of reforms provide strong justiﬁcations for empirical analysis of the role of
risk in farmers' choices and welfare in France. Unfortunately, it is too early to study the
impact of the reform of 2005, since our data set goes to 2004. Moreover, the ﬁrst years of
application are heavily driven by learning from both sides of the market, which renders any
comparison uneasy to interpret. Thus our objective here is to study the relation between
insurance and input decisions in the pre-reform period.
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3 Theoretical background
We focus our study on two typical risk management instruments of farmers6: insurance
and pesticides. The direct factors that aﬀect the demand for insurance are the farmer's
coeﬃcient of risk aversion, the cost of insurance, and the characteristics of the insured risk
such as the size of the risk and other characteristics of the risk probability distribution
(Henriet and Rochet, 1991; Alarie et al., 1991). The optimal insurance coverage increases
with risk aversion and the size of the risk, and decreases with the cost of insurance. Other
factors inﬂuence the demand for insurance indirectly through their impact on the farmers'
coeﬃcients of risk aversion: wealth, the presence of one or several background risks (Eeck-
houdt and Kimball, 1991), and the presence of a liquidity constraint (Gollier, 2001). Under
the reasonable assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), risk aversion de-
creases with farmers' wealth, thus so does the optimal insurance coverage. The presence
of an exogenous background risk increases the optimal insurance coverage if the agent
displays prudence in the sense of Kimball. DARA itself implies prudence. For identical
reasons, all the factors cited above are also susceptible to aﬀect the use of risk-increasing
and risk-reducing inputs such as pesticides.
Analyzing the farmers' choices of insurance and input uses also requires to take into ac-
count endogeneity between insurance demand and pesticide use. In the long run, pesticide
uses and insurance demand are taken jointly in order to maximize the farmer's utility.
Several papers examine the consequences of the introduction of a crop insurance contract
on the ﬁrms' input uses (or the dual output decision). Machnes (1995), Gollier (1996) and
Machnes and Wong (2003) consider a price-taking ﬁrm's simultaneous decisions of produc-
tion and insurance coverage when yield is aﬀected by.a multiplicative risk, i.e. proportional
to the expected production; comparing the production decisions with and without insur-
ance, they show that, under reasonable assumptions, in particular these of prudence, the
optimal production level tends to increase after insurance is introduced7. Since multiplica-
6There is an absent risk management tool in our analysis. Because of unavailable data, price hedging
decisions on futures markets have not been taken into account in the analysis. Since what matters to
producers is income risk, and price risk is certainly not less important than production risk, incorporating
price hedging into the set of risk management tools could have enriched the analysis.
7Gollier (1996) provides counterexamples. Machnes and Wong (2003) show the necessity of prudence
to obtain unambiguous eﬀect of deductible insurance on production. Such assumption was unnecessary in
Sandmo (1971)'s underproduction result.
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tive production risk is formally identical to price risk, this result recalls the traditional
underproduction result of Sandmo (1971) obtained in a context of price risk. Ramaswami
(1993) generalizes the analysis by considering a richer set of interactions between con-
trollable inputs and climatic factors, considering both risk-reducing and risk-increasing
inputs. He shows that the change in input use coming from the introduction of insurance
can be decomposed into a risk-reduction eﬀect and a moral hazard eﬀect. The direction of
these changes depend on the nature of the interaction between inputs and climatic factors.
Hau (2006) extends the analysis by examining a single non-multiplicative risk8. Chambers
and Quiggin (2000) propose a general state-space approach that allow for more tractable
analysis of production insurance and hedging decisions under risk.
This literature shows that gaining access to insurance tends to modify input use but the
direction of the change is ambiguous since it combines risk-reduction and moral hazard ef-
fects. Most of the U.S. empirical papers described in the introduction base their interpreta-
tion on the moral hazard eﬀect, i.e. the fact that insurance participation tends to decrease
the use of risk-decreasing inputs (pesticides). But as we have shown, qualitative results
contradict each other. Moreover theoretical models of simultaneous insurance-pesticides
decisions consider a single source of risk 9.
We now present the theoretical model that is the subject of our econometric estimation.
The single risk framework does not ﬁt well with the present case, since farmers of our
sample face in fact not a single but two distinct risks: hail risk and pest risk, against
which they use two independent risk management tools: hail insurance and pesticides. In
order to take into account the presence of two risks, we extend the Just-Pope production
function, which considers a single risk, by adding a multiplicative climate risk.
8The traditional approach in the literature has been to use a stochastic production function of the
form f(x, e), where x is a vector of controllable inputs (fertilizers, pesticides etc.) and e a vector of
environmental inputs (rainfall, moisture, temperature etc.) that are stochastic when x is chosen by the
farmer. The two most used speciﬁcations assume a single input, single risk production: the multiplicative
risk model, with f(x, ε˜) = xε˜ and the Just-Pope model, with f(x, θ˜) = f(x) + h(x)θ˜, with Eε˜ = ε¯ > 0 and
Eθ˜ = 0, x being a singleton.
9Moreover, this literature compares the situations with and without insurance and is therefore
adapted to the analysis of an exogenous change in the insurance regime, such as the creation of a crop
insurance programme by the government. The issue is however diﬀerent in our region study : we analyze
the simultaneous insurance and production decisions by farmers for a given insurance regime which has
been stable during the period covered in our sample. Thus, some people insure while others do not, but
everyone has access to insurance.
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y(x, θ˜, ε˜) = [f(x) + θ˜h(x)]ε˜ (1)
where x is the input, θ˜ the pest risk and ε˜ the climatic risk. These two risks are assumed
to be statistically independent. This model includes the multiplicative risk model and
the Just-Pope model as a special case, when ε˜ = 1. We assume that risk ε˜ has a binary
distribution (q, (1 − l); (1 − q), 1) where q denotes the probability of loss and l ∈ [0, 1]
is a coeﬃcient that measures the extent of the yield loss, considered as given (i.e. non
manipulable). The pest risk θ˜ is characterized by Eθ˜ = 0. It is uninsurable but can
be mitigated through the use of a self-insurance input x, which unitary cost equals c. We
adopt the usual assumption that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs with decreasing returns
to scale, which corresponds formally to h′(.) ≤ 0 and h′′(.) ≥ 0 respectively. The climatic
risk ε˜ can be covered by a private insurance contract denoted [P (α, x), α], where α ∈ [0, 1]
is the coverage rate and P (α, x) the insurance premium as a function of coverage and input
choice. Hail insurance contracts are structured as follows. A reference yield is calculated
as the last years mean yield excluding the worst and best year. Thus the reference yield
is equal to the expected yield (1 − ql)f(x). Insurance coverage α is then deﬁned as the
fraction of the reference yield. An indemnity equal to α(1− ql)f(x)− (1− l)[f(x) + θh(x)]
is thus paid when a hail shock occurs 10, with probability q. Assuming the output price w
non-stochastic, exogenous and normalized to unity, the insurance premium can be written
as:
P (α, x) = (1 + λ)q(α(1− ql)− (1− l))f(x) (2)
where λ ≥ 0 is the usual loading factor, λ = 0 corresponding to the actuarially fair
premium. With unit costs of input being equal to c and normalizing the output price to
one, the stochastic farm's proﬁt is equal to
p˜i(x, α) =
{
αf(x)− cx− P (α, x) with probability q
f(x) + θ˜h(x)− cx− P (α, x) with probability 1− q (3)
Moral hazard is not considered since it is controlled through audits. A risk-averse farmer
whose preferences are characterized by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(.)
10θ is written without a tilde when it corresponds to realization of θ˜
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with the stochastic production function presented above solves the following programme:
max
α,x
U(x, α) = Eu[W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)] (4)
The optimal choices x∗ and α∗ are given by the ﬁrst-order conditions for input and coverage.
When θ˜ = 0, the problem is reduced to the multiplicative risk case studied in the literature
presented before. The introduction of θ˜ complicates the analysis. The combination of a
risk-reducing and multiplicative model has been analyzed by Liu and Black (2004) in their
two-shock model, where the multiplicative risk is assumed to represent a price risk. They
show that the introduction of insurance has ambiguous eﬀects on input use when input is
risk-decreasing. However, their framework is diﬀerent than ours since the insurable risk
corresponds to θ˜ in our model. In our case, the presence of two independent risks can lead
to a non-monotonic marginal eﬀect of x on the reduction of variance. Appendix 6 studies
this aspect in the case of mean-variance preferences.
In addition to insurance and pesticides, acreage decisions could also be considered as a
risk management tool at the farm level. It is however assumed that acreage is long-term
decision and so does not enter into the year-to-year multiple risk-taking decision of the
farmer. This can be justiﬁed on technical grounds: switching from a rotation to another
can incur costs (yield losses, ﬁxed costs) as well as time lags. Moreover, the decision
to diversify can be the result of expected proﬁt maximization due to positive production
externalities between crops, as analyzed by Hennessy (2006). From an agronomic point
of view, these externalities come from nitrogen carry-over eﬀects and/or reduction of pest
infestations, and can be a way to maintain or increase the soil's production potential
over time. To a certain extent, crop production externalities qualify the traditional view
of acreage allocation as a standard portfolio problem, and thus the role played by risk
aversion11.
To sum up, it is generally recognized that pesticide not only reduce risk but also increase
expected production, thus increasing exposure to the second, multiplicative risk. It seems
to be intuitive that producers with higher expected production will tend to buy more
11There are other arguments for this qualiﬁcation: the allocation of labor time across crops, the farmer's
use of its own crop product for livestock, the impossibility to cultivate certain crops on a subset of plots
because of soil quality.
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insurance because the expected value of the output, and so the potential loss, is higher.
The underlying economic mechanisms at stake in these interactions may however be quite
diﬀerent depending on the theoretical framework which is considered. The following section
intents to estimate the joint demand for insurance and pesticides uses with an econometric
model involving simultaneous equations.
4 Empirical model
4.1 Econometric model
We now turn to the econometric model in order to examine hail insurance and pesticide use
decisions. Our data set does not include insurance coverage itself but insurance expenses,
for each crop. The usual way in the literature is to consider the demand for insurance
as a binary variable identifying whether the farmer participates or not (Horowitz and
Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Baquet, 1996; Wu, 1999). This is a limitation of these
studies which focus on the decision of insurance purchase only and not take into account
the level of coverage in the analysis. In spite of absent data, we choose to approximate
the demand for insurance by the premium per unit area divided by the mean product per
unit area, i.e. crop yield times crop price, calculated on the total years available. Such
normalization by the mean product allows to eliminate the mechanical increase in premium
coming from an increase in the value of the insured output, as shown by equation (2) in
the case of a linear transaction cost function.
Our approach follows the empirical literature on crop insurance and production decisions,
such as pesticide use (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Baquet, 1996), culti-
vation practices (Goodwin et al., 2004) and cropping patterns (Wu, 1999). We thus ﬁt
into the simultaneous equation approach framework. To investigate the determinants of
crop insurance demand under endogenous input use decision, we estimate our model using
individual farm panel data covering the period from 1993 to 2004 instead of the usual cross
sectional dataset. Our dataset allows us to capture individual farmers eﬀects and also to
follow the evolution of farmers' choices over a long period of time. Panel data, by taking
into account the inter-individual diﬀerences and intra-individual dynamics have several
advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data. In our case the two most important
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advantages12 are to have more accurate inference of model parameters and to control the
impact of farmer's individual heterogeneity.
Following theoretical analysis and the empirical literature, we consider in this analysis that
the farmers's crop insurance and pesticide input use decisions are made simultaneously.
Our econometric model thus corresponds to two simultaneous equations with a mixed cen-
sored/continuous dependant variables and panel data. The simultaneous equation system
can be written as follows
I∗it = X
′
1itβ1 + Pitγ1 + w1it, (5)
Pit = X ′2itβ2 + I
∗
itγ2 + w2it, (6)
and the observed counterpart is:
Iit =
{
I∗it if I
∗
it > 0,
0 otherwise.
where I∗it is the latent variable for the farmer's i insurance demand at time t, Iit is the
observed demand insurance for the farmer i, Pit is the pesticide input demand of farm i at
time t, X ′1it and X
′
2it are vectors of explanatory variables, β1, γ1, γ2, β2 are parameters to
be estimated,w1it and w2it are error terms, i = 1, ...., N indexes the farmers and t = 1, ..., T
indexes time period of observation. The error term wmit (m = 1, 2) is decomposed as
wmit = µmi + εmit, m = 1, 2, i = 1, ...N, t = 1, ...T, (7)
where µmi is the individual eﬀect for the farm i and the variable of decision m and εmit is
an i.i.d. error term for equation m.
We make the following distributional assumptions:
µmi ↪→ N(0, σ2µm), εmit ↪→ N(0, σ2εm), E(µmiεmit) = 0, for all m = 1, 2, ...,M
with
E(µmiµkj) =
{
σµmk if i = j,
0 otherwise,
12See Hsiao(2007) for a survey of advantages of Panel data.
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E(εmitεkjs) =
{
σεmk if i = j and t = s,
0 otherwise,
for all m, k = 1, 2, i, j = 1, ...N , and t, s = 1, ...T .
The model (5-6) has a mixed structure since it includes both a latent variable and its
dichotomous realization. Procedures for estimating simultaneous equation models in which
one or more equation contains limited dependent variable have been developed by Amemiya
(1974), Amemiya (1979) and Nelson and Olson (1978). This literature shows that the
FIML (Full Information Maximum Likelihood) is computationally diﬃcult and may be
infeasible. Nelson and Olson (1978) propose a simple two stage estimation procedure
where endogenous variables are replaced by predicted values obtained at ﬁrst stage by
regression upon an instrument set. This two-step procedure has the advantage to give
consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients of the model, however Amemiya (1979) shows that
this two-steps procedure misrepresents the true variances of parameters. Bootstrapping
methods were proposed in the literature to estimate consistently the parameters of the
matrix of variance covariance.
Following the literature, we estimate our model by a two-stage procedure (Maddala,
1983)13. In order to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of the variance-covariance
matrices we use bootstrap methods proposed by Efron (1979) and Efron (1987). The boot-
strapping approach consists in drawing with replacement a large number of pseudo-samples
of size N (which correspond to the number of observations in the observed data). For each
sample the two-step procedure is applied in order to generate a distribution of consis-
tently estimated parameters. Such an approach provides consistent variance-covariance
parameter estimates that are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Since our sample consists of panel data, we have to choose between a random eﬀect and
a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation. We assume a random eﬀect model because the ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation suﬀers from the incidental parameters problem14 in the case of Tobit model,
Greene (2004) shows that the incidental parameters problem causes a downward bias in
the estimated standard deviations in the Tobit model speciﬁcation. Such problem might
13Our model corresponds to the model 2 in Maddala (1983).
14The incidental parameters problem of the maximum likelihood estimator in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects
(MLE/FE) was ﬁrst analyzed by Neyman and Scott (1948) in the context of the linear regression model.
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lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the statistical signiﬁcance of the variables used
in the regressions.
The ﬁrst step of the two-stage procedure consists in estimating the reduced form of the
system (5-6) which can be written as follows 15:
I∗it = X
′
itΠ1 + ξ1it, (8)
Pit = X ′itΠ2 + ξ2it, (9)
where X ′it includes all the exogenous variables in X
′
1it and X
′
2it. This ﬁrst step of the
procedure provides us with estimates of the parameters Π1, Π2 as well as the matrix of
variance covariance of individual eﬀects and iid error terms. In our case, we estimate the
equation in (8) by a random eﬀect Tobit model and the equation in (9) by ML-RE model.
In the second step, we estimate the equation (5) by RE-Tobit after substituting P̂it for Pit
and the equation (6) by RE-ML after substituting Î∗it for I
∗
it. This two stage procedure
gives consistent estimates of the model coeﬃcients (Maddala, 1983), but the estimates of
variance of the coeﬃcients may be inconsistent because predicted values of the endogenous
variables are used in the second stage of the estimation procedure.
Marginal eﬀects. Computation of elasticity measures requires calculation of marginal
eﬀects from the RE-Tobit model16. Given the censored nature of insurance demand equa-
tion diﬀerent marginal eﬀects can be computed for each explanatory variable. For each
explanatory variable xj , we have calculated at the mean of the sample, the three elastici-
ties17:
1. Conditional elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of
the expected insurance demand given that the farmer holds an insurance contract.
Elaconditional =
∂ lnE(I|I >, x = x)
∂ lnxj
= βj
xj
E(I|I >, x = x) (10)
15See the appendix 6.3 for more details.
16As proposed by Wooldridge (2002) the marginal eﬀects were estimated by making the normalization
of the individual-speciﬁc eﬀects such as E(µ) = 0.
17see Greene (2008).
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2. Probability elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of
the probability that a farmer holds an insurance contract.
Elaproba =
∂ lnPr(I > 0|x = x)
∂ lnxj
=
∂Pr(I > 0|x = x)
∂xj
xj
Pr(I > 0)
(11)
3. Unconditional elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity
of the expected insurance demand
Elaunconditional =
∂ lnE(I|x = x)
∂ lnxj
= βj × Pr(I > 0|x = x) xj
E(I|x = x) (12)
As we have
E(I|x = x) = Pr[I > 0|x = x]× E[I|I > 0, x = x], (13)
we can easily show that for each explanatory variable, the total elasticity is the sum of the
probability elasticity and the conditional elasticity:
Elaunconditional = Elaconditional + Elaproba (14)
4.2 Data description
The study is conducted on a sample of French farmers from the Departement of Meuse.
Our data are provided by the Management Centre (Centre de Gestion de la Meuse). Our
sample is an unbalanced panel observed between 1993 and 2004. We consider in this paper
the most important crops in terms of cultivated area: rapeseed, wheat and barley. One
interesting feature of our database is that it contains detailed information for each crop on
major inputs: fertilizers ( N, P, K), pesticide inputs (herbicides, fungicides, insecticides,
and growth regulators) and insurance.
As shouwn in table 1, approximately 88% of farmers in our sample hold a hail insurance
contract . This proportion remained almost constant over the observation period 1993-
2004, varying between a minimum of 81.90% in 1993 and a maximum of 91.25% in 2002.
Summary statistics presented in table 2 show that on average the farmers who hold a
rapeseed hail insurance contract had less CAP subsidies than farmers without hail insur-
ance contract. They are also more specialized in rapeseed production and have less animal
production revenues (related to their total revenues).
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Table 1: Farms who hold a hail insurance contract
Year Total number % of farmers who hold
of farmers hail insurance contract
1993 442 81.90%
1994 432 83.56%
1995 450 85.33%
1996 451 85.36%
1997 483 87.78%
1998 489 88.34%
1999 487 90.14%
2000 481 89.39%
2001 459 89.10%
2002 446 91.25%
2003 392 89.79%
2004 161 89.44%
Total 5173 87.55%
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Deﬁnition
primassph_col premium per unit area / mean yield
col_pacph CAP subsidies per ha
sanim_produit share of animal revenue
scol_produit share of rapeseed production
loss_ratio sum of indemnities / sum of premium
ratio_liq debts / assets
ind_ferm =1 if land renting
puthf percent of family labor
cvrdt_col CV of rapeseed yield
col_laglnprix log rapeseed lagged price
sau Total farm area
Insurance=0 Insurance=1
Mean
(std. dev.)
0
(0)
4.734
(0.917)
0.564
(0.226)
0.246
(0.099)
0.259
(0.74)
0.158
(0.131)
0.991
(0.096)
0.933
(0.132)
0.399
(0.457)
-3.166
(4.455)
16593.073
(7645.564)
Mean
(std. dev.)
0.008
(0.005)
4.672
(0.788)
0.455
(0.259)
0.287
(0.099)
0.791
(1.409)
0.183
(0.138)
0.995
(0.073)
0.906
(0.158)
0.275
(0.278)
-2.447
(3.309)
19764.295
(9979.700)
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4.2.1 Choice of explanatory variables
According to the literature and to our theoretical discussion, the demand for crop insur-
ance and risk-reducing input could be inﬂuenced by farms' characteristics such as farm's
diversiﬁcation, wealth, and liquidity constraints. We hereafter construct some proxies for
these variables as explanatory variables of insurance demand.
Diversiﬁcation. The degree of farm's diversiﬁcation is expected to have a negative
eﬀect on insurance and pesticide demands since it can be considered as a substitute to
insurance as a risk management instrument. We consider two forms of farm diversiﬁcation:
crop diversiﬁcation which refers to the classical rotation choice, and activity diversiﬁcation
which refers to the relative shares of crop activities taken as a whole with other sources of
farms' revenues, i.e. livestock in our sample. Several index provide consistent measures of
the degree of diversiﬁcation, namely the Herﬁndahl index and Theil index of entropy. With
two activities only, relative shares in the farm's total output constitute a simpler measure
of diversiﬁcation. Computation of these index revealed that they are highly correlated.
We thus choose to restrict to a single measure. Since we have only three crops and two
activities (crop and livestock), we deﬁne crop diversiﬁcation as the share of rapeseed in
the total crop product (scol_produit) and activity diversiﬁcation as the share of livestock
in the total farm product (sanim_produit). Note that since livestock activity is assumed
exogenous, the activity diversiﬁcation index can also be interpreted as a wealth eﬀect.
Wealth. If farmers display decreasing absolute risk aversion, then wealthier farmers
may perceive less of a need to insure. There is not any real consensus in the literature in
building a proxy for wealth in similar studies (farms' net present values, size index such as
land area). The following proxies for farmers' wealth are included.
Non-crop revenues. As livestock activities provide returns that are independent to crop
ones, we can interpret the activity diversiﬁcation index as a proxy for wealth in addition
to a diversiﬁcation one.
Farm size. Many studies in the literature include a measure of farm size as a proxy for
wealth. It also captures the eﬀect of size economies on the demand for insurance. We thus
include the agricultural area (SAU) as an explanatory variable.
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CAP income support. Agricultural income support policies are also a major part of farmers'
revenues, and can therefore be a strong component of the farmers' wealth eﬀect. Hence
CAP subsidies are also included as a proxy of farmers' wealth(col_pacph) as an explanatory
variable.
Financial characteristics. Financial characteristics of the farm such as debt and liq-
uidity constraints are strongly expected to aﬀect insurance and input choices through their
impact on farmers' risk aversion. More liquidity constrained farmers would insure more
ceteris paribus. We have built the three following ratios in order to capture such liquidity
constraint: the total debt ratio, the land debt ratio and the liquidity ratio (ratio_liq).
These three ratios are expected to have a positive eﬀect on insurance and input uses. For
the same liquidity constraint reason, farmers who rent land are expected to buy more in-
surance and use more pesticides because they are more leveraged (Wu, 1999). We thus
include a rent index (ind_ferm).
Loss ratio. The demand for insurance is expected to depend on the expected return
from insurance (usually negative), which includes premiums and expected indemnities. To
capture such factor, we use individual farmers' loss ratios (loss_ratio), a variable that is
equal to the total indemnities divided by total insurance premiums for the available years.
Since our panel is unbalanced, diﬀerences due to catastrophic events that arise some years
can be a source of bias between farmers (Goodwin, 1993). However, excluding these years
from our analysis would also create some bias and weaken the analysis so we kept all
available years in our sample. Heterogeneity in loss ratios can be due to by asymmetric
information if farmers are more informed that insurers about the distribution of their yield
risk. Goodwin (1993), Just et al. (1999) and more recently Goodwin et al. (2004) provided
empirical evidence of the importance of such factor on the incentive to insure in the U.S.
agricultural context.
Yield variation. In order to catch the eﬀect of crop risk on insurance and pesticides,
we include as it is usually the case in the literature18, the individual coeﬃcient of variation
18See for example Goodwin et al. (2004).
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of yield (cvrdt_col). Intuitively, a high coeﬃcient of variation reﬂects a higher crop risk
exposure, thus an incentive to get insured.
Labor composition. Total labor includes hired labor and family labor. The compo-
sition of the total labor could give us an idea of the nature of farm management. We build
an index, puthf , which is equal to the share of family labor in the total farm labor (Wu,
1999).
4.3 Estimation results
We estimate a simultaneous equation model of crop insurance demand and pesticide de-
mand using the two-stage procedure proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978) with a boot-
strapping method to estimate consistent parameters of the variance-covariance matrices.
Estimations are made on rapeseed only because this crop exhibits the higher coeﬃcients
of variation than wheat and barley.
Are insurance demand and pesticide use endogenous? The Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. To test the simultaneous equation speciﬁcation adopted in our model, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman19 test was performed to test the hypothesis that: (1) crop insurance decisions
are exogenous to pesticide input demand and (2) pesticide input demand is exogenous to
crop insurance decisions. Results of these tests are presented in table 3 and show that the
exogeneity hypothesis is rejected for the variable pesticide input in the insurance demand
equation and for the insurance demand in the pesticide input equation. These results
suggest that the two variables pesticide input and insurance demand are simultaneously
determined. This result shows that insurance and pesticides choices are made jointly and
thus provides a strong reason for our simultaneous equation model.
Model estimation. The estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4
displays the insurance model as a function of our explanatory variables and 5 displays the
pesticide choice equation. As can be seen by inspecting the results the signiﬁcant variances
19The "Durbin-Wu-Hausman" (DWH) test is numerically equivalent to the standard "Hausman test"
obtained using in which both forms of the model must be estimated. Under the null hypothesis, it is
distributed Chi-squared with m degrees of freedom, where m is the number of regressors speciﬁed as
endogenous in the original instrumental variables regression.
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Table 3: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results
Null Hypothesis DWH statistic DF Test result
crop insurance demand is 14.05 7 Rejected at 5% level of conﬁdence
exogenous to pesticide use
pesticide use is exogenous 19.43 9 Rejected at 2% level of conﬁdence
to crop insurance demand
of individual random eﬀects conﬁrms the advantage of using panel data and modeling
individual eﬀects. We conclude that the classical regression model with one single constant
term is inappropriate and that there exist in the data individual heterogeneity captured
by individual random eﬀects. The elasticities Elaunconditional,Elaconditional and Elaproba
(equations 10-12) are computed at the means of all variables and are presented in Table
6. The signiﬁcant variables in Table 4 also have signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects (elasticities)
in Table 6.
Concerning the parameters estimates, a ﬁrst important result is that the quantity of
pesticides (col_qphytophhat) used by farmers increases with the demand for insurance
(primassph_col). Moreover, the demand for insurance increases with pesticides. As we
have noted earlier, the empirical literature provided no consensus on the sign and magni-
tude of the eﬀects on insurance on pesticide demand. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993)
results suggest that crop insurance has encouraged the chemical input usage for corn pro-
ducers in the U.S. Midwest. However, Smith and Goodwin (1996) demonstrated that
fertilizer and chemical usage for Kansas wheat producers tended to be negatively corre-
lated with insurance purchases. That means that the insured Kansas wheat producers
tend to use less chemical input than the non-insured ones. Wu (1999)) has focused on the
eﬀect of crop insurance on crop patterns and chemical use in Central Nebraska Basins. The
results show that crop insurance participation encourages producers to switch the crops in
higher economic values. Thus, the expected relationship between insurance participation
and input usage is unclear. The results of Goodwin, et al. (2004) suggest a relatively
modest acreage responses to the increases in crop insurance participation.
Our estimation results concerning the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on insurance demand are in
line with our expectations. The variable scol_produit, which measure the share of rapeseed
in total crop production has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on insurance demand. This
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means that farmers that planted more rapeseed are less diversiﬁed and need more crop
insurance protection. In the same way, the variable sanim_produit which measure the
share of livestock activities in the farm revenue has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
insurance demand. This conﬁrm the fact that activity diversiﬁcation reduce risk aversion
and so insurance demand of farmers. Wu (1999) and O'Donoghue et al. (2009) ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of crop diversiﬁcation on crop insurance demand.
Concerning activity diversiﬁcation, Goodwin (1993) does not ﬁnd a statistical negative
relationship between the extent of diversiﬁcation into livestock and the tendency to insure.
Results concerning diversiﬁcation must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, a negative
correlation can be explained by a substitution eﬀect between risk management tools, but
a positive correlation, if arises, can be explained by heterogeneity in farmers' risk aversion:
ceteris paribus, more risk averse farmers would diversify more, buy more insurance and use
more risk-reducing inputs. Therefore, which of these eﬀects dominates is likely to depend
on the particular application and data set.
As expected, the CAP subsidies col_pacph have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the in-
surance demand, which can be interpreted as a wealth eﬀect. The eﬀect of direct payments
on farmers' risk preferences has been recently estimated by Koundouri et al. (2009) using
a structural model to estimate simultaneously risk preferences and technology parameters.
Direct payments were shown to substantially decrease farmers' degrees of risk aversion.
Estimation results show that a higher yield coeﬃcient of variation of rapeseed (cvrdt_col)
appears to be positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with greater demand for insurance.
Such a positive relationship is conform to the intuition. However, the coeﬃcient of variation
is in part endogenous due to input uses (in particular pesticides) and crop diversiﬁcation.
For example, more risk averse farmers could insure more against hail risk while using more
pesticides to reduce pest risk, and so exhibit a lower coeﬃcient of variation of yield, calling
for cautious interpretation.
The parameter estimate on the composition of total labor (puthf=family labor /profes-
sional labor) has the expected sign but is statistically insigniﬁcant at 10%. As expected,
land ownership also aﬀect farmers' insurance decisions ind_ferm. Farmers who rent land
tend to exhibit a higher demand for insurance.
Another interesting but not surprising result is that higher loss ratio is signiﬁcantly and
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positively correlated with greater demand for insurance. As discussed in Goodwin et al.
(2004), the fact that both higher loss ratios and higher yield coeﬃcients of variation are
positively correlated with insurance demand suggest that the cost of insurance as well
as size of the risk reduction do indeed matter in farmers' insurance decision. Finally,
the parameter estimates of the liquidity ratio ratio_liq has the expected sign but is not
signiﬁcant.
Table 4: Rapeseed insurance demand
primassph_col
col_qphytophhat 0.00344∗∗∗
(5.34)
col_pacph -0.000211∗
(-2.04)
sanim_produit -0.00312∗∗∗
(-4.13)
scol_produit 0.00218∗
(2.32)
loss_ratio 0.000664∗∗
(2.96)
ratio_liq -0.000857
(-0.93)
ind_ferm 0.00360∗∗∗
(3.67)
puthf -0.000660
(-1.31)
cvrdt_col 0.00838∗∗∗
(6.49)
_cons -0.00348
(-1.74)
sigma_u 0.00811∗∗∗
(12.08)
sigma_e 0.00317∗∗∗
(22.85)
(N × T ) 5127
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Marginal eﬀects. We now compute elasticities to get some insight about the mag-
nitudes of the relations between variables. The results are presented in Table 6. First,
we note that this magnitude is quite small concerning the relation between insurance and
pesticides: the probability to buy insurance increases by 0.026% when pesticide use in-
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Table 5: Rapeseed pesticide use
col_qphytoph
primassph_colhat 4.850∗
(2.00)
col_laglnprix 0.0105∗∗∗
(5.27)
sau 0.00000445∗∗∗
(5.03)
ann3 -0.296∗∗∗
(-15.74)
ann4 -0.129∗∗∗
(-7.99)
ann5 0.0220
(1.25)
ann6 -0.0638∗∗∗
(-4.07)
ann11 0.108∗∗∗
(4.55)
_cons 1.575∗∗∗
(66.19)
(N × T ) 5127
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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creases by one percent. Unconditional elasticity, which sums up the probability to buy
insurance with insurance demand when positive, is equal to 0.056 %. Such ﬁgures should
be interpreted cautiously since they may be the result of several eﬀects, some of them act-
ing in opposite directions: the moral hazard eﬀect, which predicts a negative relationship
between insurance demand and pesticide use, and the risk reduction eﬀect, which predicts
a positive one. In the present region study, it seems however reasonable to think that the
moral hazard eﬀect is not very important in practice because of the presence of insurers'
auditing concerning input uses. Moreover, the fact that the insured risk displays low geo-
graphical correlation at the departement level, the perceived probability of being audited
by farmers may be suﬃciently high to deter the moral hazard incentive. The positive,
although quite modest, elasticity value of pesticide use and provides some support to the
risk reduction eﬀect of insurance.
Heterogeneity in farmers' risk aversion can also explain such positive correlation but is
unobservable. In this case, a low value for elasticity could be explained by unobservable
heterogeneity in pesticide productivity. Indeed, pesticides not only reduce risk but also
increase expected yields. The latter motive may be predominant in farmers' pesticide use
decisions, explaining low values of elasticities.
These elasticity results shed some light on the complex interaction between insurance and
pesticide choices at the farm level. Although the estimated ﬁgures seem to be small, they
may be the result of countervailing incentives and/or unobservable heterogeneity. Therefore
making predictions about the consequences of crop insurance reforms in France on pesticide
uses should take these limits into consideration. During the period 1993-2004, available
private insurance contracts protected against hail risk only. Other production risks such as
drought were managed through the public fund FNGCA. Expanding the number of risks
insured by private insurance contracts would give farmers more freedom to choose their
combination of risk management tools at the farm level. This may increase the magnitude
of the relation between insurance demand and pesticides.
We now discuss the other factors aﬀecting insurance demand. Classifying them with respect
to the value of the probability elasticity and unconditional elasticity in decreasing order, we
get 1. the rent index (ind_ferm, 0.140 and 0.305 respectively), 2. the yield's coeﬃcient
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of variation , 3. CAP subsidies per ha , and , 4. activity diversiﬁcation and 5. the loss
ratio.
The values of elasticities for the yield's coeﬃcient of variation (cvrdt_col, 0.117 and 0.255)
conﬁrms the role of farmers' heterogeneity in risk exposure on insurance demand.
The other explanatory variables have interesting consequences for agricultural policy. First,
CAP subsidies (col_pacph) have a negative but quite small impact on the probability to
insure (-0.088), but a rather high one on total insurance demand (-0.192). This suggests
that the wealth eﬀect due to farmers' income support plays a non-negligible role in reducing
the consequences of income shocks due to weather events. If such income support decreases
due to forthcoming CAP reforms, farmers of our sample would be more disposed to increase
their demand for risk-management tools such as insurance against weather events.
Estimated elasticities for activity diversiﬁcation (sanim_produit) have the same order
of magnitude than these for CAP subsidies (-0.074 and -0.161), suggesting that income
diversiﬁcation is also a substantial substitute for crop insurance in our region study.
Estimated elasticities for loss ratios (loss_ratio), considered as a proxy for the cost of
insurance, are rather small (0.023 and 0.049 respectively). This suggests that a crop in-
surance policy based on premium subsidies should not lead to strong changes in insurance
demand against hail risk. These results are in line with similar studies in the United States.
In this country, only large levels of premium subsidies allowed to increase the rate of pen-
etration of insurance at the national scale. Moreover, in many cases expected indemnities
are higher than premiums, rendering insurance contracts valuable even for risk-neutral
producers. The situation is quite diﬀerent in France, where hail insurance is a mature
market, with a large rate of penetration rate and decades of existence without any govern-
ment subsidy (the average loss ratio of our sample is 0.791). Hence it is not so surprising
that the impact of a change in the cost of insurance has modest eﬀects on insurance de-
mand. Intuitively, such impact could be more substantial for multiple peril crop insurance
contracts, introduced through a public-private partnership in France in 2005, since they
provide coverage against an extended set of risks, some of them displaying strong spatial
correlation, hence higher premiums. From a theoretical perspective, shows that a risk-
averse individual20 always insurance against a low probability-high loss event if he buys
20In fact, any individual having preferences that display the second-order stochastic dominance property.
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insurance for any other risk having the same expected loss. This suggests that crop insur-
ance contracts extended to low frequency risks (typically drought) would always be bought
by farmers who already have a hail insurance contract under identical transaction costs.
However several factors are susceptible to curb insurance demand for this extended set of
risks. First, these risks may not only diﬀer in their distribution but also in their trans-
action costs. Insurance premiums are more diﬃcult to calculate for less frequency risks,
and spatial correlation as well as ambiguity may imply premium overloading by insurers.
Second, there is substantial empirical evidence that shows individuals are reluctant to buy
insurance against low probability events, or even do not consider at all risks under a certain
probability threshold. At last, the insurance decision requires processing information and
learning, so emerging insurance contracts may require a time lag for adaptation.
Table 6: Marginal eﬀects: elasticities at the sample mean
xj
∂ lnE(I|x=x)
∂ lnxj
∂ lnE(I|I>0,x=x)
∂ lnxj
∂ lnP (I>0|x=x)
∂ lnxj
col_qphytophhat 0.056** 0.030** 0.026**
(2.36) (2.35) (2.36)
col_pacph -0.192*** -0.104*** -0.088***
(-5.77) (-5.76) (-5.67)
sanim_produit -0.161*** -0.087*** -0.074***
(-4.40) (-4.43) (-4.32)
scol_produit -0.023 -0.012 -0.010
(-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.84)
loss_ratio 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.023***
(3.75) (3.76) (3.71)
ratio_liq 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
ind_ferm 0.305** 0.164** 0.140**
(2.29) (2.29) (2.29)
puthf -0.079 -0.043 -0.037
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.49)
cvrdt_col 0.255*** 0.138*** 0.117***
(13.34) (13.75) (11.81)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper investigates the determinants of hail insurance and pesticide use decisions
using an original panel dataset of French farms covering the period 1993-2004. Statistical
tests show that the pesticide use and insurance demand are endogenous to each other and
simultaneously determined. An econometric model involving two simultaneous equations
with a mixed censored/continuous dependent variables is then estimated.
The results of our estimation are twofold. First, it is conﬁrmed that insurance demand has
a positive eﬀect on pesticide use and vice versa, providing empirical support for the inter-
dependence of technical choices and insurance decisions. However, it is also shown that the
magnitude of this relation, measured by elasticities, is quite small. Several explanations are
proposed for this result: the presence of countervailing incentive eﬀects of insurance (risk
reduction and moral hazard), the ambiguous role of risk-decreasing inputs on the variance
of yield, or the preponderance of the expected proﬁt motive versus the risk-reducing one
in pesticide use decisions by farmers. From an environmental policy perspective, this sug-
gests that reforms aiming at facilitating the access to insurance against an expanded set of
risks or reducing the cost of insurance may have positive but modest eﬀects on pesticides
use. With monoperil hail insurance contracts, moral hazard temptations concerning the
use of pesticides may be more easy to control than for multiperil crop insurance contracts,
for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is that estimating the relative impact of pest and climate
shocks on the ﬁnal yield may be more diﬃcult when multiple climate shocks enters the
insurance contract. Another problem associated with multiple peril insurance contracts
is that increasing the number of covered peril could possibly increase correlation across
individual claims (drought), thus lower the probability of audit.
Second, the analysis of the explanatory factors of insurance demand conﬁrm some theo-
retical predictions and have interesting consequences for agricultural policy analysis. CAP
subsidies have been shown to have a statistically signiﬁcative and negative inﬂuence on
insurance demand, and in turn on pesticide use. This is in line with the assumption that
farmers' preferences are characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, conﬁrming re-
sults of several other studies in France and abroad. From an agricultural policy perspective,
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this suggests that decrease in CAP subsidies would increase the farmers' propensities to
pay for risk management instruments, underlying the need for an integrated approach
between income support and risk management policies in this sector. Activity diversiﬁca-
tion has also a statistically signiﬁcant and negative inﬂuence on insurance demand, which
conﬁrms the assumption that whole-farm diversiﬁcation is a substitute to insurance and
risk-reducing inputs. More surprising is the fact that crop diversiﬁcation is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This suggests that diversiﬁcation is more an issue at the whole-farm level than
at the crop acreage level. This points out interesting questions in terms of environmental
policy in the agricultural sector. Indeed, our results suggest that encouraging crop rota-
tions against monoculture would have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the intensity of
pesticide use per hectare. Crop rotations thus may be chosen for other reasons than risk.
They can be more proﬁtable in expectation due to positive external eﬀects between crops
that follow each other, or be the result of other constraints such as soil qualities, which are
not included in our data set. Our results show that farmers with riskier yields tend to buy
more insurance, which is in line with theoretical predictions. The loss ratio, has a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect but of small magnitude on insurance demand, suggesting a low price elasticity
of demand for insurance. Crop insurance premium subsidies could thus have small impacts
on insurance demand. However, it should be noted that the insurance contracts that are
analyzed in the present study are not the same than those that are actually subsidized in
France, which cover multiple risks. Finally, we have shown that ﬁnancial ratios are not
statistically signiﬁcant, which is also surprising.
Future challenges. The results of this study could be enhanced and continued in
several ways.
First, we do not consider price risk in our analysis. This is clearly a shortcut since the-
ory suggests that production and insurance decisions are distorted when prices risk is
introduced. Moreover, the CAP reforms of the 90's and beginning of 2000's signiﬁcantly
decreased price ﬂoors for major crops in the European Union, leading to a potential in-
crease of real or perceived price risk for farmers. However, futures and forward markets
were also available in France during the period covered by our sample, allowing farmers to
transfer price risks to ﬁnancial markets and so signiﬁcantly reduce the importance of price
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risk. Unfortunately, farmers' positions on futures and forward markets are not available in
our database, preventing us to include price hedging decisions in our analysis.
Second, our data concerning phytosanitary products are aggregate expenses, which include
a set of speciﬁc inputs targeted to diﬀerent sources of risks (moisture, etc.). It is possi-
ble that some producers are more exposed to some speciﬁc risks that are more costly to
self-insure than others. We have assumed a continuous relation between the quantity of
pesticides used (measured by the expenses) and the magnitude of loss reduction. In reality,
the timing of application may be also determinant, so equal applied quantities with diﬀer-
ent fractioning can lead to diﬀerent results in terms of loss reduction, but these actions are
not observable. Phytosanitary (as well as fertilizer) decisions have in fact a dynamic na-
ture, which can include observation and learning by the producer. Such ingredients would
suggest a more subtle theoretical framework but is out of the scope of this paper.
Third, we foresee to carry out estimations by generalizing this exercise to the two major
crops in the sample: wheat and barley, as well as considering the simultaneous demands
for insurance for the three crops and including fertilizers in our analysis. This would allow
to generalize our analysis of multiple risks management by farmers.
Fourth, it would be interesting to build a structural model that would allow joint estimation
of technology and preferences. This requires to deepen the theoretical analysis of the joint
demand for insurance and pesticides with two independent risks. This would allow us to
conﬁrm our results concerning the shape of farmers' preferences as well as making useful
comparisons with results obtained elsewhere, in particular Mosnier et al. (2009) in the
French case.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Theoretical model
In order to get some insights about basic intuitions concerning the role of pesticides, let
us consider the case of a quadratic utility function:
u[W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)] = a+ b(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)) + 0.5γ(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α))2
where a, b and γ are parameters such that b+γ(W˜0+p˜i(x, α)) > 0. The farmer's preferences
display risk aversion if γ < 0 (respectively risk loving if γ > 0 and risk neutrality if γ = 0).
Under such speciﬁcation, expected utility can be written as a function of expected wealth
and the variance of wealth only. Indeed,
Eu[W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)] = a+ bE(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)) + 0.5γE(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α))2
i.e.
Eu[W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)] = a+ bE(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)) + 0.5γ
[
(EW˜0 + p˜i(x, α)))2 +Var(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α))
]
Thus expected utility can be rewritten as a non-linear function of these two arguments,
z(., .)
Eu[W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)] = z
[
E(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α)),Var(W˜0 + p˜i(x, α))
]
To keep things simple, assume that W˜0 = 0 and that insurance is unavailable, i.e. α = 0.
With our production function speciﬁcation involving two risks, expected proﬁt and the
variance of proﬁt can be written as, respectively,
Ey(x, θ˜, ε˜) = ε¯f(x)
and
Var[y(x, θ˜, ε˜)] = σ2ε [f(x)]
2 + σ2θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯)[h(x)]
2
Proof.
Computing expected yield, we get
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Ey(x, θ˜, ε˜) = ε¯f(x) +E(ε˜θ˜)h(x)
= ε¯f(x) +
(
E(ε˜)E(θ˜) +Cov(ε˜, θ˜)
)
h(x) (15)
Since by assumption E(θ˜) = 0 and Cov(ε˜, θ˜) (ε˜ and θ˜ being two independent random
variables), we thus get that
Ey(x, θ˜, ε˜) = ε¯f(x)
Turning to the variance of yield, we have
Var[y(x, θ˜, ε˜)] = Var[ε˜f(x) + ε˜θ˜h(x)]
= Var(ε˜f(x)) +Var(ε˜θ˜h(x)) + 2Cov(ε˜f(x), ε˜θ˜h(x)) (16)
We consider each term of this sum:
Var(ε˜f(x)) = σ2ε [f(x)]
2 (17)
Var[ε˜θ˜h(x)] =
{
E(ε˜2θ˜2)− [E(ε˜θ˜)]2}[h(x)]2
=
{
E(ε˜2)E(θ˜2) +Cov(ε˜2, θ˜2)− [E(ε˜)E(θ˜) +Cov(ε˜, θ˜)]2}[h(x)]2 (18)
We know that E(θ˜) = 0. Moreover, the fact that ε˜ and θ˜ being two independent random
variables implies that Cov(ε˜, θ˜) = 0 and Cov(ε˜2, θ˜2) = 0. Hence this expression reduces
to
Var[ε˜θ˜h(x)] = E(ε˜2)E(θ˜2)[h(x)]2
= σ2θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯)[h(x)]
2 (19)
Hence we get
Var[y(x, θ˜, ε˜)] = σ2ε [f(x)]
2 + σ2θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯)[h(x)]
2 (20)
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End of proof.
The farmer's input choice is thus given by the following programme:
max
x
U(x, 0) = z
[
ε¯f(x)− cx, σ2ε [f(x)]2 + σ2θ(σ2ε + ε¯2)[h(x)]2
]
(21)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal choice of input use, x∗ is given by the ﬁrst-order
condition
ε¯f ′(x∗)z1 −
{
σ2εf
′(x∗)f(x∗) + σ2θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯
2)h′(x∗)h(x∗)
}
z2 = c (22)
Looking at the ﬁrst-order condition, we see the double impact of a marginal increase in
x on the variance of yield. On the one hand, since by assumption h′(.) ≤ 0 it reduces
the farmer's exposure to risk θ˜ (risk-decreasing input). On the other hand it increases
the exposure to the other risk, ε˜. Without further speciﬁcations of f and h and imposing
conditions on the values of the parameters σ2ε , σ
2
ε and ε¯
2, there is no clear cut conclusion
on the fact that a marginal increase in x increases or reduces the variance of yield. For
some values of parameters, the variance of yield can be a non-monotonic function of x. For
small x, the variance decreases, and up to a certain level of x, it increases. This is explained
by the relative strengths of the risk-reduction eﬀect of x on θ˜ and its risk-increasing eﬀect
on ε˜. To see this, consider the following speciﬁcations: f(x) = k1
√
x and h(x) = 11+k2x
where k1 and k2 are two positive parameters. Computing the variance as a function of x,
we obtain:
Var[y(x, θ˜, ε˜)] = σ2εk
2
1x+ σ
2
θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯)
1
(1 + k2x)2
Thus we get
∂Var[y(x, θ˜, ε˜)]
∂x
= σ2εk
2
1 −
k2σ
2
θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯)
(1 + k2x)3
and
∂2Var[y(x, θ˜, ε˜)]
∂x2
=
3k22σ
2
θ(σ
2
ε + ε¯)
(1 + k2x)3
≥ 0
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Hence the variance is convex in x. The sense of variation depends on the values of param-
eters. More precisely, if σ2εk
2
1 − k2σ2θ(σ2ε + ε¯) ≥ 0, then the variance is increasing with on
the interval [0,+∞[. If σ2εk21 − k2σ2θ(σ2ε + ε¯) < 0, the variance is decreasing on the interval
[0, σ2εk
2
1 − k2σ2θ(σ2ε + ε¯)[ and increasing on the interval [σ2εk21 − k2σ2θ(σ2ε + ε¯),+∞[. In the
latter case, for small values of x, the ris-reduction eﬀect dominates while for higher values
the risk-increasing eﬀect dominates due to the fact that x increases the production scale.
Thus the eﬀect of x on the variance of yield is non-monotonic.
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6.3 Econometric model
I∗it = X
′
1itβ1 + Pitγ1 + w1it, (23)
Pit = X ′2itβ2 + I
∗
itγ2 + w2it, (24)
Then,
I∗it = X
′
1itβ1 + (X
′
2itβ2 + I
∗
itγ2 + w2it)γ1 + w1it (25)
Pit = X ′2itβ2 + (X
′
1itβ1 + Pitγ1 + w1it)γ2 + w2it, (26)
I∗it = X
′
1itβ˜1 +X
′
2itβ˜2γ1 + w2itγ˜1 + w˜1it (27)
Pit = X ′2itβ˜2 +X
′
1itβ˜1γ2 + w1itγ˜2 + w˜2it, (28)
where β˜k =
βk
1−γ1γ2 and w˜1it =
wkit
1−γ1γ2 , for k = 1, 2.
